Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences

Consider a three-alternative election with n voters and assume that preferences are single-peaked. LetC(λ,n) be the Condorcet efficiency of the rule that assigns 1,λ and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place vote. An exact representation is obtained forC(λ,∞). This relation shows that Borda rule (λ=1/2) is not the most efficient rule. In addition to this result, exact closed form relations are provided forC(0,n),C(1/2,n) andC(1,n). All these relations are obtained by assuming that every admissible configuration of preferences is equally likely to occur. This research was supported in part by the Swedish Insitute     

The economic effects of reducing and reorganizing working time

This article goes beyond the often ideological debate for and against a reduction in working time and analyses the effects of shorter working time at company and country levels. Logic and experience dictate that such reductions must be accompanied by a process of work reorganization and include financial compensation for those working shorter hours. However, while these three ingredients are indissoluble, not all firms can proceed at the same pace and in the same ways. Nevertheless, the article shows that, as long as implementation proceeds in a decentralized and selective manner and is accompanied by a judicious reorganization of these hours, it could be extremely beneficial to all parties—companies, the state and individuals, both workers and producers.     

Assessment and selection of management consultants: A comparative cognitive study between small- and large-scale companies

This paper explores alternative ways of evaluating and ultimately hiring a generalist consultancy for short- and medium-term projects, and how this is shaped by the size of the clients’ company. What buying factors do managers of small and large firms have in mind when hiring consultants for their projects?Instead of employing surveys incorporating predefined buying factors based on what the researchers think would be important, a cognitive mapping methodology - the repertory grid technique - is applied to investigate the underlying phenomena. Using the repertory grid technique to draw mental models is a novel research technique within the supply management field. Recent behavioral supply chain management research found the behavior of managers to be critically influenced by mental models: the lenses through which managers perceive, simplify and interpret the world.Results show differences between the buying factors used in small- and large-scale companies: managers of large companies are more ‘reputation and outcome-oriented’ and managers of small businesses are more concerned with ‘how the services are rendered’. However, both constituents stressed the importance of expertise, quality and the relationship between the client and the management consultancy, although the character of such a relationship differed between small- and large-scale firms. Results also point out criteria that managers of small and large companies employ to discriminate between good and poor performing consultancies and to judge service delivery. The practical implications for both companies hiring consultancies and the consultancy companies are discussed. For consultancies, our findings can help tailoring their efforts to a differing clientele when marketing and selling their services. For companies hiring consultancies, fixating too much on particular buying factors may lead to biased decisions.     

THE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY GAP IN FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY

We investigate public–private pay determination using French, British and Italian microdata. While traditional methods focus on parametric methods to estimate the public sector pay gap, in this paper, we use both non-parametric (kernel) and quantile regression methods to analyze the distribution of wages across sectors. We show that the public–private (hourly) wage differential is sensitive to the choice of quantile and that the pattern of premia varies with both gender and skill. In all countries the public sector is found to pay more to low skilled workers with respect to the private sector, whilst the reverse is true for high skilled workers. When comparing results across countries, we find that where pay formation is more regulated (i.e. as in France and Italy) the public sector pay gap is smaller; whilst where market factors play a larger role in pay determination (i.e. as in Great Britain) the public sector pay gap is larger—particularly in the lower part of the wage distribution—and females are much better off in the public sector as compared to the private sector.     

Preponderance of evidence

This paper investigates the incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence when evidence about injurers’ behavior is imperfect. We show that a “more-likely-than-not” decision rule provides maximal incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care. An injurer is then held liable whenever inadequate care appears more likely than due care, and not liable otherwise. Our analysis provides a deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rules of evidence found in common law and the preponderance of evidence standard of proof.     

Constant scoring rules,condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences

Summary A constant scoring rule asks each individual to vote for a given (and constant) number of alternatives and the alternative with the most votes is elected. A sequential constant scoring rule applies this principle in a process of sequential elimination. Constant scoring rules as well as sequential constant scoring rules fail to satisfy Condorcet criteria when individual preferences are unrestricted. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if we assume that preferences are single-peaked, then some constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion and some sequential constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The results we provide make possible the identification of these rules.I thank Maurice Salles and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.